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JURISDICTION OVER IMIOVABLES:
The LiAttle Case Revisited After Sixty Years
ROBERT B. LooPE.R*
By the overwhelming weight of Anglo-American authority,
trespass to land is considered a local action," maintainable only in
the state of the situs. The Minnesota court was the first American
court to repudiate this common-law view, in the now-classic case
of Little v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0 Ry.2 decided in 1896. In the
sixty yeais that have passed since then the doctrine adumbrated in
the Little case has found increasing support among American
writers and judges. The time is now ripe to assess the standing of
the Little doctrine in that branch of the conflict of laws that goes
under the delusive rubric of "jurisdiction over immovables."
THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE OF LOCALIZATION
With respect to the common-law rule one can say, with apologies
to Justice Holmes, that a page of history will explain volumes of
illogic. At early common law all actions in England were considered
local. This rule had its origins in the established policy which re-
quired that jurors have personal knowledge of the facts in issue and
therefore that a case be tried by a jury in the vicinage.3 With such
a system prevailing it was obviously impossible to give redress for
a foreign tort, since it was strictly necessary that the neighborhood
where the jury was summoned be that where the cause of action
had arisen. This difficulty disappeared, however, when evidence
could be presented to the jury by the testimony of witnesses. But
there was another difficulty in England. Originally the jurisdiction
of the king's court in personal actions was based upon the commis-
*Rockefeller Fellow, Oxford University, England. B.A. 1949, ALA.
1950, Yale Umversity; LL.B. 1953, University of Oklahoma. Member, Okla-
homa and American Bar Associations.
1. For jurisdictional purposes a local action may be defined as one
which must be brought in the state where the subject matter of the dispute
arose. A transitory action, per contra, may be maintained in the courts of
any state where the defendant can be legally served, though the operative
facts which gave rise to the cause of action took place in a foreign jurisdiction.
2. 65 Mfinn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896).
3. 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law 117 (3d ed. 1924).
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sion of a breach of the king's peace, and, as this was a jurisdic-
tional fact, the tort, including the breach of the peace, had to be laid
as occurring at some place within the kingdom. This obstacle, like
so many of the common-law technicalities, was circumvented by a
fiction. A fictitious venue was laid at some place within the kingdom,
and such allegation could not be disputed. From this time it became
possible in England to sue for a foreign tort, and personal actions
ex delicto were held to be transitory
One exception to this rule was made the action for trespass to
land. As a result of the innate conservatism of the medieval judiciary
with respect to matters affecting land, the courts refused to employ
this fiction where the cause of action arose out of trespass to foreign
realty The strongly territorial flavor of English procedure was
overcome on all points save one the strict rule requiring a proper
venue for trespass.
This anachronistic rule did not fit modern commercial society
Lord Mansfield, the jurist who sought to grapple with so many of
the obsolete technicalities of the common law, went out of his way
in Mostyn v. Fabrgas4 to refer to two earlier unreported decisions
wherein he had entertained jurisdiction of actions for damages to
real estate lying abroad. Mansfield characterized these actions as
transitory The old rule was reverted to, however, in Doulson v
Matthews5 because, said Justice Buller, it was "too late" to con-
sider whether the rule "was wise or politic."
The doctrine of the local nature of trespass actions now seems
firmly entrenched in England as the result of the leading case of
British South Africa Company v. Cornpanhia de Mocambtque.o In
this case the plaintiff company alleged that it was in possession of
large tracts of land and mines in South Africa and that the de-
fendant company by its agents wrongfully broke and entered and
took possession of these lands. The plaintiff claimed (1) a declara-
tion that it was lawfully entitled to the lands, (2) an inunction
restraining the defendant company from continuing to occupy or
from asserting any title to the lands, and (3) damages for trespass.
The High Court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. In
the Court of Appeal the plaintiff formally abandoned its claim for a
declaration of title and an injunction, and that court by a 2-1
majority declared that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain
the claim for damages for trespass. The House of Lords unani-
4. 1 Cowp. 161, 1 Smith's Leading Cas. 1087 (1774).
5. 4 Term. Rep. 503, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1792).
6. [1893] A. C. 602.
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mously reversed this ruling on the ground that trespass was not a
transitory action such that a claim arising abroad was cognizable
by English courts. Although the essence of the Mocambiquc case
was a clear conflict, of title between plaintiff and defendant, the
judgment of Lord Herschell seemed to rest on broader grounds.
By expressly repudiating the holdings of Lord Mansfield and ap-
proving the ruling of Dodsoin v. Matthews, the House of Lords
seemed to invoke a blanket rejection of jurisdiction.7
In the United States the question whether a trespass action is
local or transitory was first considered in Livingston v. Jefferson.4
The dramatic facts of that case arose in the field of high politics.
-Jefferson, shortly after the Louisiana purchase, ordered Livingston,
one of the most prominent Federalist leaders, ejected from lands in
New Orleans to which the President claimed title as part of the
public domain. When Jefferson's term of office was over, Livingston
brought a personal action for damages in the only place where per-
sonal service could be had, viz. Virginia. Jefferson pleaded to the
jurisdiction, alleging simply that the land in question was situated
outside the district of Virginia in which the federal court was lo-
cated. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on circuit, sustained this plea
and dismissed the action. Marshall conceded that on reason such
actions were transitory, being only for damages. He expressed his
approval of the 'statement of Lord Mansfield that the true distinc-
tion in respect to jurisdiction was between proceedings which are
in rem,-therefore appropriately triable only at the situs, and pro-
ceedings against the person, appropriately triable wherever the
person can be found. In making a contrary holding, however,
Marshall declared that he. yielded to the compulsion of precedent.
But the great Federalist must have welcomed the common-law doc-
trine as an expedient to avoid deciding on the merits a case which
was so full of political gunpowder.9
7 Later English cases seem to have established three exceptions to the
Mocambique rule. (1) English courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
rghts in foreign immovables, if the defendant is affected by some personal
obligation arising out of contract or implied contract, fiduciary relationship
or fraud, or other conduct which in the view of a court of equity would be
unconscionable. Deschamps v. Miller, [1908] 1 Ch. 856. (2) Where an
English court has jurisdiction to administer an estate or a trust, and the
property includes movables or immovables situated in England and im-
movables situated abroad, the court has jurisdiction to determine questions
of title to the foreign immovables for the purposes of the administration. In
re Hoyles, 11911] I Ch. 179. In re Ross, [1930] 1 .Ch. 377 (3) English
courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action in rem against a ship to en-
force a maritime lien on the ship for damage done to foreign immovables. The
Tolten, 11946] P. 135.
8. 15 Fed. Gas. 660, No. 8411 (C. C. D. Va. 1811).
9. See 4 Beveridge, Life of farshall 103-116 (1919) ; 1 Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History 401-403 (1922).
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Marshall's holding induced a vast proliferation of precedent in
the state and federal courts, virtually every case following the old
common-law doctrine and citing Lnnngston v. Jefferson as authori-
ty 10 The Restatement" thus summarizes what has always been the
great weight of opinion in the United States "No action can be
maintained in one state to recover compensation for a trespass upon
or harm done to land in another state." It was in the face of this
long line of precedent and authority that the Minnesota court de-
cided the Little case.
CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE
The Little case involved an action for damages to realty in Wis-
consin brought in a Minnesota court. The defendant railroad com-
pany asserted no title to the land involved, and the damage was
negligently inflicted so that the action was in the nature of trespass
on the case. Allowing the maintenance of such an action in the face
of the common-law rule, the court said
"We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents, and the
authority of the doctrine of stare decisis, but, inasmuch as tils
rule is in no sense a rule of property, and as it is purely techni-
cal, wrong in principle, and in practice often results in a total
denial of justice, and has been so generally criticised by eminent
jurists, we do not feel bound to adhere to it, notwithstanding
the great array of judicial decisions in its favor." '
Until 1952, however, the Little case stood alone in America as the
only example of direct judicial repudiation of the common-law rule
localizing all trespass actions. 13 Although practically every American
court which adopted this rule condemned it, it seemed that only the
Minnesota court had the courage to break with stare decisis and
attack the rule frontally
But in 1952 the Arkansas Supreme Court rendered its judgment
in Reasor-Hill Corp v. Harrison14 and in so doing added its weight
to the holding of the Minnesota court. Here a Missouri landowner
had engaged an Arkansas flying service to spray his cotton crop.
When the crop was damaged as a result of the spraying, the land-
owner sued in Arkansas, joining as defendants the flying service
10. The citation of these cases would be endless. They are collected
in Note, 42 A. L. R. 196 (1926).
11. Restatement. Conflict of Laws § 614 (1934).
12. Little v. Chicago St. P M. & 0. Ry., 65 Minn. 48 at 53, 67 N. W
846 at 847 (1896).
13. However in Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1904), the
United States Circuit Court followed the rule of the Little case upon the
ground that the question was a local one, as to which the federal court was
bound by the decision of the state court.
14. 249 S. W 2d 994 (1952)
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and the manufacturer of the insecticide. On the basis of the rule
that suits for injury to realty can only be brought in the state where
the land is located, the manufacturer sought a writ of prohibition
to prevent the lower court from assuming jurisdiction. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court denied the writ, holding the action to be transi-
tory and therefore triable in the court below. In support of this
decision the Arkansas court relied on the Little case and supported
its judgment by quotations from this earlier decision denouncing
the common-law rule as archaic and unjust.
The validity of this stricture in the Little case has received an-
other recognition-albeit non-judicial-from the New York state
legislature which abolished the common-law rule by statute in
1917.'- So far,. however, few states have followed the example of
New York in expressly conferring on its courts jurisdiction to try
actions involving damage to foreign, realty.
The Missouri court, nevertheless, has adopted the position that
the state statutory abolition of local venue in trespass cases is a
sufficient ground for rejecting the doctrine that trespass actions are
local for jurisdictional purposes.1 6 Like Missouri, many other
states have expressly abrogated the common-law requirement of
local venue for trespass actions where no question of title is in-
volved. If, by such a statute, an action may be brought in any
county of a state, is it logical for the courts of that state to hold
that such actions are local as between states? Only the Missouri
court has declared that the statutory abolition of local venue for
trespass actions has worked an implied repudiation of the Living-
ston v. Jefferson rule. The House of Lords in the Mocamnbique
case7' and the New York Court of Appeals per Cardozo in Jacobus
v. Colgate'8 both held that the statutory abolition of local venue did
not enlarge their jurisdiction in respect of injuries to foreign land,
since venue and jurisdiction are to be sharply distinguished."
Many state venue statutes, on the other hand, require actions
for trespass to land to be brought in the county where the land is
15. N. Y. Real Prop. Law § 536 (1939).
16. Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153 S. W. 2d 547 (Mo. App.
1941), holding that an action for 'trespass to realty could be maintained in
Missouri though the property-was located in Kansas.
17. British South Africa Co. v. Companla de Mocambique, [1893]
A. C 602.
18. 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. F. 837 (1916).
19. Venue refers to the place of trial, whereas jurisdiction refers to the
power to hear the case. Venue assumes that jurisdiction is present, but de-
fines the place of- its exercise. Venue is procedural, jurisdiction (over the
subject matter) is substantive. Venue can be waived, jurisdiction (over the
subject matter) cannot.
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situated. That the distinction between local and transitory actions
is still preserved in this respect as between counties in the same
state has been given as an argument against repudiating the com-
mon-law rule in respect to actions for trespass to land situated in
another state. Both the Minnesota court in the LittIc case and the
Arkansas court in the Reasor-Hill case rejected this argument and
repudiated the common-law rule even in the face of local venue
statutes. 20 It might appear, however, that from a policy viewpoint
the reasons supporting the intrastate localization of trespass actions
apply a fortiori to their interstate localization because of the greater
distances involved and because of the interstate non-compellability
of witnesses. Such an argument poses this question If a trespass
action must be brought within one county of a state, is it logical
for the courts of that state to hold that such action could be transi-
tory as between states ? The answer is probably yes. The intrastate
localization of an action merely specifies the place of trial in one
county but allows service of process to run throughout the state.
Interstate localization, on the other hand, confines not only the
place of trial but the territorial limits within which process must
run. Only if summons from one state court were servable through-
out the nation, would localization as between counties be an argu-
ment for localization as between states.
The relevance of state venue statutes to jurisdictional problems,
then, is not clear. The retention of the requirement of local venue
for trespass actions could be construed as an affirmation of the
common-law doctrine. The abolition of local venue for trespass
actions involving no title dispute could be construed as a pro tanto
repudiation of that doctrine. The weight of authority is against both
constructions, and the fundamental arguments against the common-
law doctrine exist independently of any particular state venue rule.
The main arguments against the common-law rule are two.
First, the localization rule may permit the defendant to escape all
liability if he prevents suit in the state where the land lies by keep-
ing beyond service of process in that jurisdiction. If the courts of
the situs cannot secure jurisdiction of the defendant, and the courts
of the defendant's domicile refuse jurisdiction of the subject of the
action, then our federal system can result in a total denial of justice
Obviously a wronged plaintiff should not be denied redress merely
20. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 542.02 (1947), Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-601 (1947)
Both courts met the objection based upon the statute by the statement that
the statute applies only to causes of action arising within the state, and has
no application to causes of action arising out of the state.
[Vol. 40:191
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because of the interposition of a state line between the injured prop-
erty and a wily tortfeasor. This consideration is referred to in both
the Little case and the Reasor-Hill case merely as a reason for re-
pudiating-the general rule and not as a condition of its repudiation.
It. was admitted in the Little case that the defendant might have
been sued in the state in which the property was situated, but in the
Reasor-Hill case this was not so. The frequency of situations in
which the defendant can escape process under the localization rule
has been disputed.
21
The second argument is that there is no logical distinction be-
tween taking jurisdiction in cases of contract respecting foreign
land and cases involving torts committed on the same land. The
distinction made between txespass and other in personam actions
is a mere historical fortuity, based on archaic common-law rules of
venue. "It would seem on principle that proceedings in personam,
including actions to recover danmages for trespass to land, should
be held to be transitory."22 Logically, the distinction between local
and transitory actions should coincide with that between actions in
rem and actions in personam.
These two arguments, then, the one based on considerations of
justice and the other on considerations of logic, militate against the
prevailing Livingston v. Jefferson doctrine. The argument that
application of the doctrine will leave the plaintiff remediless is the
more cogent, where applicable. Although it was applicable in the
Reasor-Hill case, both the Arkansas and Minnesota courts seem to
have relied mainly on the logical argument.
ARGUMENTS FOR THaE DOCTRINE
Several substantial policy considerations might be suggested as
favoring the localization of actions involving injury to land. These
can best be summed up in one phrase, "trial convenience." The con-
siderations of convenience may be grouped under two headings,
convenience to the litigants and convenience to the court itself.
Convenience to the litigants. There are a number of factors here.
Trial at the situs facilitates access to sources of proof since in a
trespass action the larger number of witnesses is almost always
21. "Instances may occur where a person havmg no property in a state
may commit an injury to real property therein and leave the state, thereby
defeating a recovery, but it is rarely the case that serious injury may be
perpetrated with such expedition nd secrecy as to prevent an action being
begun and service of summons upon him." Montesano Lumber Co. v. Portland
Iron Works. 78 Ore. 53 at 67, 152 Pac. 244 at 248, (1915).
22. 3 Beale Conflict of Laws 1652 (1935).
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near the location of the land. If trial is in another forum, the parties
are unable to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses resident
at the situs, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses
at a distant forum might well be prohibitive. The possibility of a
view of the premises by a local jury reduces the hazard of specula-
tion on the issue of damages. Obviously such a view cannot be had
by a jury in a distant forum. Finally, trial in a distant forum might
present an opportunity to the plaintiff to vex and inconvenience the
defendant out of all proportion to what is necessary for a fair
presentation of the plaintiff's own case-or, what is worse, to use
the threat of such vexation to coerce settlement of a doubtful claim
otherwise than on the basis of its merits. The common-law rule
prevents the vexatious importation of a trespass action into a dis-
tant forum.
Convenience to the court itself. Trial in another forum results in
the unnecessary injection into the suit of problems in conflict of
laws and in foreign law Also, from the viewpoint of judicial ad-
ministration it is impracticable to try foreign title disputes away
from their source. For the trespass actions which involve issues of
title, trial at the situs obviates this difficulty
The weakness of all these arguments, save the last, is that they
prove too much. Most of the considerations of convenience apply
equally to all transitory actions, meeting the objections posed would
consequently involve localizing all litigation. The argument based
on the impracticability of trying foreign title disputes, on the other
hand, has more substance, focusing as it does on a unique aspect
of our problem. Hence it has been the point most propounded by
courts attempting to rationalize the common-law rule.
If there is one principle firmly embedded in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, both historically and conceptually, it is this A con-
troversy directly affecting title to land is exclusively determinable
not only by the law of the situs but by the courts of the situs. The
application of this principle to our problem, however, is by no means
as apparent as often assumed. Many actions for injuries to realty
involve no issue of title whatever, none, for example, was involved
in the Little and Reasor-Hill cases. Even if the issue is involved, the
determination of the foreign title for the purposes of the suit would
seem to be merely the incidental determination of a fact such as any
court is compelled to make daily There are other species of action,
regularly entertained by American courts, which sometimes in-
volve title to land outside the state, e.g. specific performance actions
[Vol. 40:191
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for breach of contract relating to foreign land.23 A distinction be-
tween trespass and specific performance cases can, however, be
made. The inconvenience of foreign trespass cases results from the
circumstance that the witnesses and other sources of proof are
generally to be found near the land. In contract cases, on the other
hand, there is a greater resort to books and documents which are
readily transpo:kable. Thus a contract can be brought into a distant
court, while land is peculiarly immobile. Trespass cases ari in their
very nature, then, more highly localized so that the court of the
situs is likely to be the most appropriate forum.
FORUm NON CONVENIENS AN ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE
The situs is likely to be' the most appropriate forum but will not
necessarily be so in all cases. The arguments discussed above simply
emphasize certain considerations of fact which point to the probable
convenience of one forum-the situs-as against the probable in-
convenience of any other forum for the trial of a trespass action.
These fact considerations, however, in no way derogate from the
cogency of the arguments against the common-law rule. The prob-
lem of determining the proper forum for any particular civil action
should be viewed as a problem in social engineering. In the case of
trespass actions a more flexible solution to this problem is needed,
a solution which meets the arguments against the common-law rule
and yet takes into account the desirability of localizing controversies
affecting land.
Such a solution might be to hold all trespass actions transitory,
so that any proper state court having jurisdiction over the parties
would have the power (though not the duty) to hear the case, but
place limits on the exercise of this power by application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This broad doctrine "deals with
the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed
23. Actions for conversion of timber and minerals on foreign land may
also involve title disputes. It has been held that even though tort liability may
turn upon the issue of ownership of the land itself, such actions may be
maintained. Stone v. U. S., 167 U. S. 178, 17 Sup. Ct. 778, 42 L. Ed. 127
(1897); Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 ..fe.
213, 110 AtL 429 (1920); Copper State Mining C. v. Kelvin Lumber &
Supply Co., 111 Tex. Com. Rep. 48, 227 S. W. 938 (1921). Conlra: Arizona
Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185, 128 N. E. 4 (1920). But
when an action is brought for removal of timber or minerals from land, the
action is transitory only if the plaintiff chooses to make the gravamen of his
suit the conversion; it is local if recovery is sought for the damage done to
the land itself. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 105, 15 Sup. Ct.
771, 39 L. Ed. 913 (1895). "It is suggested that the distinction [is] very much
like that between tweedledum and tweedledee, which is a matter of the end-
ing only." Potomac Milling & Ice Co. v. B. & 0. Ry., 217 Fed. 665, 668
(D. Md. 1914).
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jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be
more appropriately tried elsewhere."24 Since each state is free to
determine for itself the extent to which its courts shall hear actions
arising outside the state, deciding that a court is empowered to
adjudicate a controversy involving foreign land would not be con-
clusive of the question of whether it must do so.
It has been contended that the principle that actions for trespass
to foreign land will not be entertained is a special manifestation of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.2 5 Such a view is erroneous.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens involves a discretionary de-
nial of jurisdiction on an ad hoe basis after a consideration of the
particular facts of each case. The common-law doctrine of localiza-
tion, on the other hand, involves a blanket rejection of jurisdiction
in all foreign trespass cases without any discretionary determina-
tion of the appropriateness thereof. It is the former doctrine which
is contended for. The courts of the chosen forum should be free to
accept or decline jurisdiction in their own discretion after full con-
sideration of the arguments (described above) for and against
localization as they apply to each particular case. If the plaintiff
cannot secure service in the state where the land is located, then
obviously the action should be entertained elsewhere. If the plaintiff
has an available forum at the situs, however, he probably should
be remitted to that forum. The right to seek redress is fundamental,
but the privilege to seek redress in one particular set of courts
should be discretionary
It must be admitted, however, that only a few courts have recog-
nized the doctrine of forum non convemens ;1 most American courts
seem to follow the open-door policy with respect to all foreign
transitory litigation. 27 This means that any transitory action is held
triable as of right wherever the defendant can be served. Such an
extreme position makes courts reluctant to abandon the common-
law doctrine localizing all trespass actions, a position representing
the other extreme. Admitting the transitory nature of trespass ac-
tions, but placing some limits on their free maintenance abroad,
24. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1929).
25. Ibid.
26. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 23 (3d ed. 1949) The Restatement does
not recognize the doctrine as such. Several recent Supreme Court decisions
have, however, recognized the doctrine. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947) , Koster v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 67 Sup. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1917)
27 See, for example, H. Rouw Co. v. Railway Exp. Agency, 154 S. W
2d 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
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represents a middle course promising the most feasible solution to
the problem of the proper forum.2S
CONCLUSION
There is a genuine reason for the distinction between transitory
and local actions, that is, between those in which the facts relied on
as the foundation of the plaintiff's case have no necessary connection
with a particular locality and those in which there is such a con-
nection. All proceedings in rem should be, and under the settled
principles of the conflict of laws, are, local. But all in personam
actions, including trespass, should be considered transitory, main-
tainable wherever service on the defendant can be obtained subject
to the doctrine of forum non convemens.
The common-law rule is otherwise. Apparently this rule does
not distinguish between the different kinds of actions relating to
land. The phrase "jurisdiction over immovables" used in conflict
treatises as a general rubric for these cases only perpetuates this
confusion, since in most cases the jurisdiction sought to be invoked
is not over the land itself but over the person of the defendant who
has infringed the plaintiff's interest (possessory or proprietary) in
the land.
Three views are tenable as to the precise scope of the common-
law rule:
(a) Courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title to
foreign land. In a significant English case - Scott L. J. expressed
the view obiter that the House of Lords might hereafter restrict the
scope of the Mocambique rule to this narrow proposition and might
grant damages for trespass to foreign land. Although the parent
American case of Livzngston v. Jefferson, like the Mocambique
case, arose out of a title dispute, later American cases have shown
no inclination to confine the rule to this narrow a scope. On the
other hand both the Little and Reasor-Hill cases, which purported
to overrule the common-law doctrine, did not dispute this narrow
proposition.
(b) Courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title to
foreign land or to grant damages for trespass quare clausum fregit.
This view seems to be adopted by Cheshire,30 but there is no clear
judicial support for confining the rule to this precise scope.
28. Such a solution, of course, imposes a heavier burden on the court of
-the clibsen forum. The problem of deciding which little cause of action goes
to market and which little cause of action stays home may well involve time-
consuming preliminary hearings.
29. The Tolten, [1946] Prob. 135.
30. Cheshire, Private International Law 715 (3d ed. 1947).
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(c) Courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title to
foreign land or to grant damages for either trespass q.c.f. or trespass
on the case (e.g. for nuisance or negligence) There is no English
case which carries the Mocambique rule as far as this, though there
are Canadian cases. 3' It is, however, a legitimate deduction from
the Lttle and Reasor-Hill cases that the rule does so extend, for if
it did not, it would have been easy to say so, both cases being for
negligence.
If the common-law rule is conceived as extending beyond the
first proposition, it is apparent that the rule can produce at worst a
total denial of justice and at best some glaring anomalies. Such a
rule finds no support in any other of the world's legal systems and
has been expressly repudiated in such civil law jurisdictions as
Louisiana 2 and Quebec.3 3 In addition to Mansfield and Marshall,
such distinguished commentators as Story,3 4 Cardozo,85 Scott,"'
Beale,87 Rabel,38 Goodrich 9 and Stumberg40 all condemn the rule
as archaic and unjust.
There are four possible methods of shedding the incubus of the
common-law doctrine of localization.
(a) The first is express statutory abolition. Thus far few states
have been willing to follow New York in taking this step.
(b) The second is by an act of judicial casuistry State statutes
abolishing local venue for trespass actions could be construed as
working an implied repudiation of the common-law rule as to juris-
diction. Only the Missouri court has adopted this course, and its
logical weakness is apparent quite apart from the practical difficulty
that more than half the states have retained local venue rules for
trespass actions.
(c) The third method is by open judicial legislation on the
model of the Little case, thus holding all trespass actions transitory
So far only the Arkansas court has been willing to follow the
precedent of the Little case, on its own initiative breaking with the
overwhelming weight of authority.
31. Brereton v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co., [1894] 29 0. R. 57;
Albert v. Fraser Companies, [1937] 1 D. L. R. 39.
32. Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849).
33. Glasgow Ins. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 34 Lower Canada Jurist 1(1888).
34. Conflict of Laws §§ 544, 545 (8th ed. 1883).
35. Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837, 840 (1916).
36. Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law 32 (1922)
37 3 Conflict of Laws 1657 (1935), The Jursdiction of Courts over
Foreigners, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 291 (1913).
38. 2 Conflict of Laws 246, 247 (1947).
39. Conflict of Laws 271 (3d ed. 1949).
40. Conflict of Laws 174, 175 (2d ed. 1951).
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(d) This break would be made easier in the future, however, if
the courts imposed a forum non conveniens qualification when
adopting the Little doctrine.
It is, of course, to be hoped that the legislatures of our states will
follow the New York example and remove the dead hand of the
past at one stroke. The possibility of remedial legislation, however,
should not be ground for adhering to the common-law rule.'1 In
the considerable number of states where the question is still open,
it is to be hoped that the courts will be prevailed upon to follow the
example of the Minnesota court in the Little case rather than the
numerical weight of authority.
41. "We cannot deny to the judicial process capacity for unprovement,
adaptation, and alteration unless we are prepared to leave all evolution and
progress in the law to legislative processes." Mr. Justice Jackson, Decisional
Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944).

